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Cloud of Smoke, Pillar of Fire

*To the memory of my father,
Rabbi Eliyahu Chaim Greenberg,
1894-1975*

I. Judaism and Christianity: Religions of Redemption and the Challenge of History

Both Judaism and Christianity are religions of redemption. Both religions come to this affirmation about human fate out of central events in history. For Jews, the basic orientating experience has been the Exodus. Out of the overwhelming experience of God's deliverance of His people came the judgment that the ultimate truth is not the fact that most humans live nameless and burdened lives and die in poverty and oppression. Rather, the decisive truth is that man is of infinite value and will be redeemed. Every act of life is to be lived by that realization.

For Christians, the great paradigm of this meaning is the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. By its implications, all of life is lived.

The central events of both religions occur and affect humans in

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history. The shocking contrast of the event of salvation come and the cruel realities of actual historical existence have tempted Christians to cut loose from earthly time. Yet both religions ultimately have stood by the claim that redemption will be realized in actual human history. This view has had enormous impact on the general Western and modern view that human liberation can and will be realized in the here and now.

Implicit in both religions is the realization that events happen in history which change our perception of human fate, events from which we draw the fundamental norms by which we act and interpret what happens to us. One such event is the Holocaust—the destruction of European Jewry from 1933 to 1945.

The Challenge of the Holocaust

Both religions have always sought to isolate their central events—Exodus and Easter—from further revelations or from the challenge of the demonic counter-experience of evil in history. By and large, both religions have continued since 1945 as if nothing had happened to change their central understanding. It is increasingly obvious that this is impossible, that the Holocaust cannot be ignored.

By its very nature, the Holocaust is obviously central for Jews. The destruction cut so deeply that it is a question whether the community can recover from it. When Adolf Eichmann went into hiding in 1945, he told his accomplice, Dieter Wisliceny, that if caught, he would leap into his grave laughing. He believed that although he had not completed the total destruction of Jewry, he had accomplished his basic goal—because the Jews could never recover from this devastation of their life center. Indeed, Eichmann had destroyed 90 percent of East European Jewry, the spiritual and biological vital center of prewar world Jewry. Six million Jews were killed—some 30 percent of the Jewish people in 1939; but among the dead were over 80 percent of the Jewish scholars, rabbis, full-time students and teachers of Torah alive in 1939. Since there can be no covenant without the covenant people, the fundamental existence of Jews and Judaism is thrown into question by this genocide. For this reason alone, the trauma of the Holocaust cannot be overcome without some basic reorientation in light of it by the surviving Jewish community. . . .

The Holocaust as Radical Counter-Testimony To Judaism and Christianity

For Christians, it is easier to continue living as if the event did not make any difference, as if the crime belongs to the history of another people and faith. But such a conclusion would be and is sheer self-deception. The magnitude of suffering and the manifest worthlessness of human life radically contradict the fundamental statements of human value and divine concern in both religions. Failure to confront and account for this evil, then, would turn both religions into empty, Pollyanna assertions, credible only because believers ignore the realities of human history. It would be comparable to preaching that this is the best of all possible worlds to a well-fed, smug congregation, while next door little children starve slowly to death.

Judaism and Christianity do not merely tell of God's love for man, but stand or fall on their fundamental claim that the human being is, therefore, of infinite and absolute value. ("He who saves one life it is as if he saved an entire world"—B. T. Sanhedrin 37a; "God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten son"—John 3:16.) It is the contradiction of this intrinsic value and the reality of human suffering that validates the absolute centrality and necessity of redemption, of the Messianic hope. . . .

In short, the Holocaust poses the most radical counter-testimony to both Judaism and Christianity. Elie Wiesel has stated it most profoundly:

Never shall I forget the little faces of the children, whose bodies I saw turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky.

Never shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever.

Never shall I forget that nocturnal silence which deprived me, for all eternity, of the desire to live.

Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my soul and turned my dreams to dust.

Never shall I forget these things, even if I am condemned to live as long as God Himself. Never.¹

The cruelty and the killing raise the question whether even those who believe after such an event dare talk about God who loves and cares without making a mockery of those who suffered.

Further Challenge of the Holocaust to Christianity

THE MORAL FAILURE AND COMPLICITY OF ANTI-SEMITISM. Unfortunately, however, the Holocaust poses a yet more devastating question to Christianity: What did Christianity contribute to make the Holocaust possible? The work of Jules Isaac, Norman Cohn, Raul Hilberg, Roy Eckardt, and others poses this question in a number of different ways. In 1942, the Nietra Rebbe went to Archbishop Kametko of Nietra to plead for Catholic intervention against the deportation of the Slovakian Jews. Tiso, the head of the Slovakian government, had been Kametko's secretary for many years, and the rebbe hoped that Kametko could persuade Tiso not to allow the deportations. Since the rebbe did not yet know of the gas chambers, he stressed the dangers of hunger and disease, especially for women, old people, and children. The archbishop replied: "It is not just a matter of deportation. You will not die there of hunger and disease. They will slaughter all of you there, old and young alike, women and children, at once—it is the punishment that you deserve for the death of our Lord and Redeemer, Jesus Christ—you have only one solution. Come over to our religion and I will work to annul this decree."²

There are literally hundreds of similar anti-Semitic statements by individual people reported in the Holocaust literature. As late as March 1941—admittedly still before the full destruction was unleashed—Archbishop Grober (Germany), in a pastoral letter, blamed the Jews for the death of Christ and added that "the self-imposed curse of the Jews, 'His blood be upon us and upon our children' had come true terribly, until the present time, until today."³ Similarly the Vatican responded to an inquiry from the Vichy government about the law of June 2, 1941, which isolated and deprived Jews of rights: "In principle, there is nothing in these measures which the Holy See would find to criticize."⁴

In general, there is an inverse ratio between the presence of a fundamentalist Christianity and the survival of Jews during the Holocaust period. This is particularly damning because the attitude of the local population toward the Nazi assault on the Jews seems to be a

critical variable in Jewish survival. (If the local population disapproved of the genocide or sympathized with the Jews, they were more likely to hide or help Jews, resist or condemn the Nazis, which weakened the effectiveness of the killing process or the killer's will to carry it out.) We must allow for the other factors which operated against the Jews in the countries with a fundamentalist Christianity. These factors include Poland and the Baltic nations' lack of modernity (modernity = tolerance, ideological disapproval of mass murder, presence of Jews who can pass, etc.); the isolation and concentration of Jews in these countries, which made them easy to identify and destroy; the Nazis considered Slavs inferior and more freely used the death penalty for any help extended to Jews; the Nazis concentrated more of the governing power in their own hands in these countries. Yet even when all these allowances are made, it is clear that anti-Semitism played a role in the decision not to shield Jews—or to actually turn them in. If the Teaching of Contempt furnished an occasion—or presented stereotypes which brought the Nazis to focus on the Jews as the scapegoat in the first place; or created a residue of anti-Semitism in Europe which affected the local populations' attitudes toward Jews; or enabled some Christians to feel they were doing God's duty in helping kill Jews or in not stopping it—then Christianity may be hopelessly and fatally compromised. The fact is that during the Holocaust the church's protests were primarily on behalf of converted Jews. At the end of the war, the Vatican and circles close to it helped thousands of war criminals to escape, including Franz Stangl, the commandant of the most murderous of all the extermination camps, Treblinka, and other men of his ilk. Finally in 1948, the German Evangelical Conference at Darmstadt, meeting in the country which had only recently carried out this genocide, proclaimed that the terrible Jewish suffering in the Holocaust was a divine visitation and a call to the Jews to cease their rejection and ongoing crucifixion of Christ. May one morally be a Christian after this?⁵

EVEN SOME CHRISTIANS WHO RESISTED HITLER FAILED ON THE JEWISH QUESTION. Even the great Christians—who recognized the danger of idolatry, and resisted the Nazi government's takeover of the German Evangelical Church at great personal sacrifice and risk—did not speak out on the Jewish question.⁶ All this suggests that something in Christian teaching supported or created a positive

context for anti-Semitism, and even murder. Is not the faith of a gospel of love, then, fatally tainted with collaboration with genocide—conscious or unconscious? To put it another way: If the Holocaust challenges the fundamental religious claims of Christianity (and Judaism), then the penumbra of Christian complicity may challenge the credibility of Christianity to make these claims.

IS THE WAGER OF CHRISTIAN FAITH LOST? There is yet a third way in which this problem may be stated. In its origins, Christianity grew out of a wager of faith. Growing in the bosom of Judaism and its Messianic hope, Jesus (like others), could be seen either as a false Messiah or as a new unfolding of God's love, and a revelation of love and salvation for mankind. Those who followed Jesus as the Christ, in effect, staked their lives that the new orientation was neither an illusion nor an evil, but yet another stage in salvation and a vehicle of love for mankind. "The acceptance . . . of Jesus as the Messiah means beholding him as one who transforms and will transform the world."⁷ As is the case with every vehicle, divine and human, the spiritual record of this wager has been mixed—comprising great inspiration for love given and great evils caused. The hope is that the good outweighs the evil. But the throwing into the scales of so massive a weight of evil and guilt raises the question whether the balance might now be broken, whether one must not decide that it were better that Jesus had not come, rather than that such scenes be enacted six million times over—and more. Has the wager of faith in Jesus been lost? . . .

II. The Challenge to Modern Culture

. . . For the world, too, the Holocaust is an event which changes fundamental perceptions. Limits were broken, restraints shattered, that will never be recovered, and henceforth mankind must live with the dread of a world in which models for unlimited evil exist. . . .

The Demonic in the Modern World

. . . No assessment of modern culture can ignore the fact that science and technology—the accepted flower and glory of modernity—now

climaxed in the factories of death; the awareness that the unlimited, value-free use of knowledge and science, which we perceive as the great force for improving the human condition, had paved the way for the bureaucratic and scientific death campaign. There is the shock of recognition that the humanistic revolt, celebrated as the liberation of humankind in freeing man from centuries of dependence upon God and nature, is now revealed—at the very heart of the enterprise—to sustain a capacity for death and demonic evil. . . .

One of the most striking things about the Einsatzgruppen leadership makeup is the prevalence of educated people, professionals, especially lawyers, Ph.D.'s, and yes, even a clergyman.⁸ How naive the nineteenth-century polemic with religion appears to be in retrospect; how simple Feuerbach, Nietzsche, and many others. The entire structure of autonomous logic and sovereign human reason now takes on a sinister character. . . .

As Toynbee put it, "a Western nation, which for good or evil, has played so central a part in Western history . . . could hardly have committed these flagrant crimes had they not been festering foully beneath the surface of life in the Western world's non-German provinces. . . . If a twentieth-century German was a monster, then, by the same token a twentieth-century Western civilization was a Frankenstein guilty of having been the author of this German monster's being."⁹ This responsibility must be shared not only by Christianity, but by the Enlightenment¹⁰ and democratic cultures as well. Their apathy and encouragement strengthened the will and capacity of the murderers to carry out the genocide, even as moral resistance and condemnation weakened that capacity.

The Moral Failure and Complicity of Universalism

Would that liberalism, democracy, and internationalism had emerged looking morally better. But, in fact, the democracies closed their doors to millions of victims who could have been saved. America's record is one of a fumbling and feeble interest in the victims which allowed anti-Semites and provincial economic and patriotic concerns to rule the admission—or rather the nonadmission—of the refugees. Indeed, the ideology of universal human values did not even provide sufficient motivation to bomb the rail lines and the gas chambers of Auschwitz when these were operating at fullest capacity, and when disruption

could have saved ten thousand lives a day. Thus the synthetic rubber factory at Buna in the Auschwitz complex was bombed, but the death factory did not merit such attention.¹¹ The ideology of universalism did have operational effects. It blocked specifying Jews as victims of Nazi atrocities, as in the Allied declaration of January 1942, when the Nazis were warned they would be held responsible for their cruel war on civilians. In this warning, the Jews were not mentioned by name on the grounds that they were after all humans, not Jews, and citizens of the countries in which they lived. The denial of Jewish particularity—in the face of the very specific Nazi war on the Jews—led to decisions to bomb industrial targets to win the war for democracy, but to exclude death factories—lest this be interpreted as a *Jewish* war! The very exclusion of specifying Jews from warnings and military objectives was interpreted by the Nazis as a signal that Jews were expendable. They may have read the signal correctly. In any event, liberalism and internationalism became cover beliefs—designed to weaken the victims' perception that they were threatened and to block the kind of action needed to save their lives. . . .¹²

Especially disastrous was the victims' faith in universalism and modern humanitarian values. It disarmed them. [As Alexander Donat wrote:]

The basic factor in the Ghetto's lack of preparation for armed resistance was psychological; we did not at first believe the Resettlement Operation to be what in fact it was, systematic slaughter of the entire Jewish population. For generations East European Jews had looked to Berlin as the symbol of law, order, and culture. We could not now believe that the Third Reich was a government of gangsters embarked on a program of genocide "to solve the Jewish problem in Europe." We fell victim to our faith in mankind, our belief that humanity had set limits to the degradation and persecution of one's fellow man. . . .¹³

III. *The Holocaust as Orienting Event and Revelation*

Not to Confront Is to Repeat

For both Judaism and Christianity (and other religions of salvation—both secular and sacred) there is no choice but to confront the Holo-

caust, because it happened, and because the first Holocaust is the hardest. The fact of the Holocaust makes a repetition more likely—a limit was broken, a control or awe is gone—and the murder procedure is now better laid out and understood. Failure to confront it makes repetition all the more likely. So evil is the Holocaust, and so powerful a challenge to all other norms, that it forces a response, willy-nilly; not to respond is to collaborate in its repetition. This irony of human history which is already at work, is intensified by the radical power of the Holocaust. Because the world has not made the Holocaust a central point of departure for moral and political policy, the survivors of the Holocaust and their people have lived continually under the direct threat of another Holocaust throughout the past thirty years. Muslims who feel that the event is a Western problem and that Christian guilt has been imposed on them have been tempted to try to stage a repeat performance. They lack the guilt and concern, and that in itself leads to guilt.

The nemesis of denial is culpability. Pope John XXIII, who tried strongly to save Jews in the Holocaust (he made representations and protests, issued false baptismal papers, helped Jews escape), felt guilty and deeply regretted the Catholic Church's past treatment of Jews. This pope did more than any other pope had ever done to remove the possibility of another destruction (through the Vatican II Declaration, revising Catholic instruction and liturgy with reference to the Jews, dialogue, etc.).* Pope Paul VI, who denied the complicity or guilt of Pius XII in the Holocaust, was tempted thereby into a set of policies (he watered down the Declaration, referred to Jews in the old Passion story terms, refused to recognize Israel's *de jure* political existence, maintained silence in the face of the threat of genocide), which brings the dreadful guilt of collaboration in genocide so much closer.

This principle applies to secular religions of salvation as well. Thus, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) has denied any responsibility for the Holocaust, on the grounds that it was carried

*Writing under a pseudonym, a priest who had served as ghost writer for Pope John published a report on Vatican II which stated that John had composed a prayer about the Jews. The text, to be read in all Catholic churches, said: "We are conscious today that many centuries of blindness have cloaked our eyes so that we can no longer see the beauty of Thy chosen people. . . . We realize that the mark of Cain stands on our foreheads. Across the centuries our Brother Abel has lain in blood which we drew, or shed tears we caused, forgetting Thy love. Forgive us for crucifying Thee a second time in their flesh. For we knew not what we did . . ."¹⁴ While the prayer is apocryphal (no trace of it has been found in John's papers), widespread acceptance of its attribution reflects John's known regret and concern.

out by fascist and right-wing circles, whereas East Germany is socialist. As a result, it has allowed Nazis back into government with even more impunity than West Germany. Whereas West Germany has given back billions of dollars of Jewish money in the form of reparations (it is estimated that many more billions were directly stolen and spoiled), the GDR, having no guilty conscience, has yielded up none of the ill-gotten gains of mass murder. In fact, East Germany and its "socialist" allies have pursued policies which have kept the genocide of the Jewish people in Israel a live option to this day. Thus, failure to respond to the Holocaust turns a hallowed ideology of liberation into a cover for not returning robbed goods and for keeping alive the dream of another mass murder. . . .

The Holocaust cannot be used for triumphalism. Its moral challenge must also be applied to Jews. Those Jews who feel no guilt for the Holocaust are also tempted to moral apathy. Religious Jews who use the Holocaust to morally impugn every other religious group but their own are the ones who are tempted thereby into indifference at the Holocaust of others (cf. the general policy of the American Orthodox rabbinate on United States Vietnam policy). Those Israelis who place as much distance as possible between the weak, passive Diaspora victims and the "mighty Sabras" are tempted to use Israeli strength indiscriminately (i.e., beyond what is absolutely inescapable for self-defense and survival), which is to risk turning other people into victims of the Jews. Neither faith nor morality can function without serious twisting of perspective, even to the point of becoming demonic, unless they are illuminated by the fires of Auschwitz and Treblinka.

The Dialectical Revelation of the Holocaust

The Holocaust challenges the claims of all the standards that compete for modern man's loyalties. Nor does it give simple, clear answers or definitive solutions. To claim that it does is not to take burning children seriously. This surd will—and should—undercut the ultimate adequacy of any category, unless there were one (religious, political, intellectual) that consistently produced the proper response of resistance and horror at the Holocaust. No such category exists, to my knowledge. To use the catastrophe to uphold the univocal validity of any category is to turn it into grist for propaganda mills. The Nazis turned their Jewish victims into soap and fertilizer after they were

dead. The same moral gorge rises at turning them into propaganda. The Holocaust offers us only dialectical moves and understandings—often moves that stretch our capacity to the limit and torment us with their irresolvable tensions. In a way, it is the only morally tenable way for survivors and those guilty of bystanding to live. Woe to those so at ease that they feel no guilt or tension. Often this is the sign of the death of the soul. I have met many Germans motivated by guilt who came to Israel on pilgrimages of repentance. I have been struck that frequently these were young people, too young to have participated in the genocide; or, more often, persons or the children of persons who had been anti-Nazi or even imprisoned for resistance. I have yet to meet such a penitent who was himself an SS man or even a train official who transported Jews. Living in the dialectic becomes one of the verification principles for alternative theories after the Holocaust.

Let us offer, then, as working principle the following: No statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the burning children. In his novel *The Accident*, Elie Wiesel has written of the encounter of a survivor with Sarah, a prostitute who is also a survivor. She began her career at twelve, when she was separated from her parents and sent to a special barracks for the camp officers' pleasure. Her life was spared because there were German officers who liked to make love to little girls her age. Every night she reenacts the first drunken officer's use of a twelve-year-old girl. Yet she lives on, with both life feeling and self-loathing. And she retains enough feeling to offer herself to a shy survivor boy, without money. "You are a saint," he says. "You are mad," she shrieks. He concludes, "Whoever listens to Sarah and doesn't change, whoever enters Sarah's world and doesn't invent new gods and new religions, deserves death and destruction. Sarah alone has the right to decide what is good and what is evil, the right to differentiate between what is true and what usurps the appearance of truth."¹⁵

In this story Wiesel has given us an extraordinary phenomenology of the dialectic in which we live after the Holocaust. Sarah's life of prostitution, religiously and morally negative in classic terms, undergoes a moral reversal of category. It is suffering sainthood in the context of her life and her ongoing response to the Holocaust experience. Yet this scene grants us no easy Sabbatianism, in which every act that can wrap itself in the garment of the Holocaust is justified and the old categories are no longer valid. The ultimate tension of the dialectic

is maintained, and the moral disgust which Sarah's life inspires in her (and Wiesel? and us?) is not omitted either. The more we analyze the passage the more it throws us from pole to pole in ceaseless tension. The very disgust may, in fact, be the outcome of Sarah's mistaken judgment; she continues to judge herself by the categories in which she was raised before the event. This is suggested in the narrator's compassion and love for her. Yet he himself is overcome by moral nausea—or is it pity?—or protest?—until it is too late and Sarah is lost. There is no peace or surcease and no lightly grasped guide to action in this world. To enter into Sarah's world in fear and trembling, and to remain there before and in acting and speech, is the essence of religious response today, as much as when normative Judaism bids us enter into the Exodus, and Christianity asks we enter into Easter and remain there before and in acting or speaking. The classic normative experiences themselves are not dismissed by Wiesel. They are tested and reformulated—dialectically attacked and affirmed—as they pass through the fires of the new revelatory event.¹⁶

Resistance to New Revelation: Jewish and Christian

Much of classic Jewish and Christian tradition will resist the claim that there have been new revelatory events in our time. Judaism has remained faithful to the covenant of Sinai and rejected this claim when expressed in the life of Jesus as understood by St. Paul and the Christian church, or in the career of Sabbatai Zevi and others. . . .¹⁷ The very quality of faithfulness to the covenant resists acceptance of new revelation—as it should. Human nature's love for the familiar conspires with faithfulness to keep new norms out. But no one said that the Holocaust should be simply assimilable. For traditional Jews to ignore or deny all significance to this event would be to repudiate the fundamental belief and affirmations of the Sinai covenant: that history is meaningful, and that ultimate liberation and relationship to God will take place in the realm of human events. Exodus-Sinai would be insulated from all contradictory events—at the cost of removing it from the realm of the real—the realm on which it staked its all—the realm of its origin and testimony. However much medieval Judaism was tempted to move redemption to the realm of eternal life, it never committed this sacrilege. It insisted that the Messianic Kingdom of God in this world was not fulfilled by the salvation of the world to come. . . .¹⁸ There is an

alternative for those whose faith can pass through the demonic, consuming flames of a crematorium: it is the willingness and ability to hear further revelation and reorient themselves. That is the way to wholeness. Rabbi Nachman of Bratzlav once said that there is no heart so whole as a broken heart. After Auschwitz, there is no faith so whole as a faith shattered—and re-fused—in the ovens.

Since this further revelation grows in the womb of Judaism, it may be asked whether it speaks only to Jews, or to Christians also. Classic Christianity is tempted to deny further revelation after Easter. Christianity testified and built itself on the finality of revelation in Christ's life and teaching. Yet, at its core, Christianity claims that God sent a second revelation, which grew out of the ground of acknowledged covenant, superseded the authority of the first revelation, and even supplied a new, higher understanding of the first event. Christian polemic has mocked and criticized the people of Israel for being so blinded by the possession of an earlier revelation and by pride in its finality that Israel did not recognize the time of its visitation. However unjust the polemic against Judaism was (as I believe it was), it ill behooves Christianity to rule out further revelation a priori—lest it be hoist by its own petard. Rather, it should trust its own faith that God is not owned by anyone and the spirit blows where it lists. The very anguish and harsh judgments which the Holocaust visits on Christianity (see above, pp. 307–310) open the possibility of freeing the Gospel of Love from the incubus of evil and hatred.

The desire to guarantee absolute salvation and understanding is an all too human need which both religions must resist as a snare and temptation. Just as refusal to encounter the Holocaust brings a nemesis of moral and religious ineffectiveness, openness and willingness to undergo the ordeal of reorienting by the event could well save or illuminate the treasure that is still contained in each tradition. . . .

IV. Jewish Theological Responses to the Holocaust

A Critique

There have been some notable Jewish theological responses that have correctly grasped the centrality of the Holocaust to Jewish thought and faith. The two primary positions are polar. One witness upholds the

God of History. Emil Fackenheim has described the Commanding Voice of Auschwitz, which bids us not to hand Hitler any posthumous victories, such as repudiating the covenant and retrospectively declaring Judaism to have been an illusion. Eliezer Berkovits has stressed that Jewish survival testifies to the Lord of History. The other witness affirms the death of God and the loss of all hope. Richard Rubenstein has written: "We learned in the crisis that we were totally and nakedly alone, that we could expect neither support nor succor from God nor from our fellow creatures. Therefore, the world will forever remain a place of pain, suffering, alienation and ultimate defeat."¹⁹ These are genuine important responses to the Holocaust, but they fall afoul of the dialectical principle. Both positions give a definitive interpretation of the Holocaust which subsumes it under known classical categories. Neither classical theism nor atheism is adequate to incorporate the incommensurability of the Holocaust; neither produced a consistently proper response; neither is credible alone—in the presence of the burning children.

Rubenstein's definitiveness is part of this writer's disagreement with him. Rubenstein concluded that "Jewish history has written the *final chapter* in the terrible story of the God of History"; that "the world will *forever* remain a place of pain . . . and *ultimate defeat*," and that the "pathetic hope (of coming to grips with Auschwitz through the framework of traditional Judaism) *will never be realized*" (italics supplied).²⁰ After the Holocaust, there should be no final solutions, not even theological ones. I could not be more sympathetic to Rubenstein's positions, or more unsympathetic to his conclusions. That Auschwitz and the rebirth of Israel are normative; that there are traditional positions which Auschwitz moves us to repudiate (such as "We were punished for our sins") is a profoundly, authentically Jewish response. To declare that the destruction closes out hope forever is to claim divine omniscience and to use the Holocaust for theological grist. Contra Rubenstein, I would argue that it is not so much that any affirmations (or denials) cannot be made, but that they can be made authentically only if they are made after working through the Holocaust experience. In the same sense, however, the relationship to the God of the covenant cannot be unaffected.

Dialectical Faith, or "Moment Faiths"

Faith is living life in the presence of the Redeemer, even when the world is unredeemed. After Auschwitz, faith means there are times when faith is overcome. Buber has spoken of "moment gods": God is known only at the moment when Presence and awareness are fused in vital life. This knowledge is interspersed with moments when only natural, self-contained, routine existence is present. We now have to speak of "moment faiths," moments when Redeemer and vision of redemption are present, interspersed with times when the flames and smoke of the burning children blot out faith—though it flickers again. Such a moment is described in an extraordinary passage of *Night*, as the young boy sentenced to death but too light to hang struggles slowly on the rope. Eliezer finally responds to the man asking, "Where is God now?" by saying, "Here He is—He is hanging here on this gallows . . ." ²¹

This ends the easy dichotomy of atheist/theist, the confusion of faith with doctrine or demonstration. It makes clear that faith is a life response of the whole person to the Presence in life and history. Like life, this response ebbs and flows. The difference between the skeptic and the believer is frequency of faith, and not certitude of position. The rejection of the unbeliever by the believer is literally the denial or attempted suppression of what is within oneself. The ability to live with moment faith is the ability to live with pluralism and without the self-flattering, ethnocentric solutions which warp religion, or make it a source of hatred for the other.

Why Dialectical Faith Is Still Possible

THE PERSISTENCE OF EXODUS. Of course, the question may still be asked: Why is it not a permanent destruction of faith to be in the presence of the murdered children?

One reason is that there are still moments when the reality of the Exodus is reenacted and present. There are moments when a member of the community of Israel shares the reality of the child who was to have been bricked into the wall but instead experienced the liberation and dignity of Exodus. (The reference here is to the rabbinic legend that in Egypt, Jewish children were bricked into a wall if their parents did not meet their daily quota of bricklaying.) This happens even to

those who have both literally and figuratively lived through the Holocaust. Wiesel describes this moment for us in *The Gates of the Forest*, when Gregor "recites the Kaddish, the solemn affirmation . . . by which man returns to God his crown and his scepter."²² Neither Exodus nor Easter wins out or is totally blotted out by Buchenwald, but we encounter both polar experiences; the life of faith is lived between them. And this dialectic opens new models of response to God, as we shall show below.

THE BREAKDOWN OF THE SECULAR ABSOLUTE. A second reason is that we do not stand in a vacuum when faith encounters the crematoria. In a real sense, we are always choosing between alternative faiths when we make a decision about ultimate meaning. In this culture the primary alternative to religion is secular man in a world closed off from any transcendence, or divine incursion. This world grows out of the intellectual framework of science, philosophy, and social science, of rationalism and human liberation, which created the enterprise of modernity. This value system was—and is—the major alternative faith which Jews and Christians joined in large numbers in the last two centuries, transferring allegiance from the Lord of History and Revelation to the Lord of Science and Humanism. In so many ways, the Holocaust is the direct fruit and will of this alternative. Modernity fostered the excessive rationalism and utilitarian relations which created the need for and susceptibility to totalitarian mass movements and the surrender of moral judgment. The secular city sustained the emphasis on value-free sciences and objectivity, which created unparalleled power but weakened its moral limits. (Surely it is no accident that so many members of the Einsatzgruppen were professionals.) Mass communication and universalization of values weakened resistance to centralized power, and served as a cover to deny the unique danger posted to particular, i.e. Jewish, existence.

In the light of Auschwitz, secular twentieth-century civilization is not worthy of this transfer of our ultimate loyalty. . . . Nothing in the record of secular culture on the Holocaust justifies its authority claims. The victims ask us, above all, not to allow the creation of another matrix of values that might sustain another attempt at genocide. The absence of strong alternative value systems gives a moral monopoly to the wielders of power and authority. Secular authority unchecked becomes absolute. Relative values thus become the seedbed of abso-

lute claims, and this is idolatry. This vacuum was a major factor in the Nazi ability to concentrate power and carry out the destruction without protest or resistance. (The primary sources of resistance were systems of absolute alternative values—the Barmen Conference in the Confessional Church, Jehovah's Witnesses, etc.)²³ After the Holocaust it is all the more urgent to resist this absolutization of the secular. . . .

If nothing else sufficed to undercut this absolute claim of nonaccessibility of the divine, it is the knowledge that the absence of limits or belief in a judge, and the belief that persons could therefore become God, underlay the structure of *l'univers concentrationnaire*. Mengele and other selectors of Auschwitz openly joked about this. I will argue below that the need to deny God leads directly to the assumption of omnipotent power over life and death. The desire to control people leads directly to crushing the image of God within them, so that the jailer becomes God. Then one cannot easily surrender to the temptation of being cut off from the transcendence, and must explore the alternatives. Surely it is no accident that in the past forty years language analysts like Wittgenstein, critics of value-free science and social sciences, existentialists, evangelical and counter-culture movements alike, have fought to set limits to the absolute claims of scientific knowledge and of reason, and to ensure the freedom for renewed encounter with the transcendental.

THE LOGIC OF POST-HOLOCAUST AND, THEREFORE, POST-MODERN FAITH. A third reason to resist abandoning the divine is the moral urgency that grows out of the Holocaust and fights for the presence of the Lord of History. Emil Fackenheim has articulated this position in terms of not handing Hitler posthumous victories. I prefer an even more traditional category, and would argue that the moral necessity of a world to come, and even of resurrection, arises powerfully out of the encounter with the Holocaust. Against this, Rubenstein and others would maintain that the wish is not always father to the fact, and that such an illusion may endanger even more lives. To this last point I would reply that the proper belief will save, not cost, lives. . . .

Moral necessity validates the search for religious experience rather than surrender to the immediate logic of nonbelief. Thus, if the Holocaust strikes at the credibility of faith, especially unreconstructed faith, dialectically it also erodes the persuasiveness of the secular option. If someone is told that a line of argument leads to the conclu-

sion that he should not exist, not surprisingly the victim may argue that there must be alternative philosophical frameworks. Insofar as the Holocaust grows out of Western civilization, then, at least for Jews, it is a powerful incentive to guard against being overimpressed by this culture's intellectual assumptions and to seek other philosophical and historical frameworks. . . .

The moral light shed by the Holocaust on the nature of Western culture validates skepticism toward contemporary claims—even before philosophic critiques emerge to justify the skepticism. It is enough that this civilization is the locus of the Holocaust. The Holocaust calls on Jews, Christians, and others to absolutely resist the total authority of this cultural moment. The experience frees them to respond to their own claim, which comes from outside the framework of this civilization, to relate to a divine other, who sets limits and judges the absolute claims of contemporary philosophic and scientific and human political systems. To follow this orientation is to be opened again to the possibilities of Exodus and immortality.

This is a crucial point. The Holocaust comes after two centuries of Emancipation's steadily growing domination of Judaism and the Jews. Rubenstein's self-perception as a radical breaking from the Jewish past is, I think, misleading. A more correct view would argue that he is repeating the repudiation of the God of History and the Chosen that was emphasized by the modernizing schools, such as Reconstructionism. This position had become the stuff of the values and views of the majority of Jews. "Being right with modernity" (defined by each group differently) has been the dominant value norm of a growing number of Jews since 1750, as well as Christians. Despite the rear-guard action of Orthodox Judaism and Roman Catholicism (until the 1960s) and of fundamentalist groups, the modern tide has steadily risen higher. The capacity to resist, criticize, or break away from these models is one of the litmus tests of the Holocaust as the new orienting experience of Jews, and an indication that a new era of Jewish civilization is under way. This new era will not turn its back on many aspects of modernity, but clearly it will be freer to reject some of its elements, and to take from the past (and future) much more fully.

THE REVELATION IN THE REDEMPTION OF ISRAEL. I have saved for last the most important reason why the moment of despair and disbelief in redemption cannot be final, at least in this generation's

community of Israel. Another event has taken place in our lifetime which also has extraordinary scope and normative impact—the rebirth of the State of Israel. As difficult to absorb in its own way and, like the Holocaust, a scandal for many traditional Jewish and Christian categories, it is an inescapable part of the Jewish historical experience in our time. And while it is a continuation and outgrowth of certain responses to the Holocaust, it is at the same time a dialectical contradiction to many of its implications. If the experience of Auschwitz symbolizes that we are cut off from God and hope, and that the covenant may be destroyed, then the experience of Jerusalem symbolizes that God's promises are faithful and His people live on. Burning children speak of the absence of all value—human and divine; the rehabilitation of one-half million Holocaust survivors in Israel speaks of the reclamation of tremendous human dignity and value. If Treblinka makes human hope an illusion, then the Western Wall asserts that human dreams are more real than force and facts. Israel's faith in the God of History demands that an unprecedented event of destruction be matched by an unprecedented act of redemption, and this has happened.²⁴

This is not simply a question of the memories of Exodus versus the experience of Auschwitz. If it were a question of Exodus only, then those Jews already cut off from Exodus by the encounter with modern culture would be excluded and only "religious" Jews could still be believers.

But almost all Jews acknowledge this phenomenon—the event of redemption and the event of catastrophe and their dialectical interrelationship—and it touches their lives. Studies show that the number of those who affirm this phenomenon as central (even if in nontheological categories) has grown from year to year; that its impact is now almost universal among those who will acknowledge themselves as Jews, and that its force has overthrown some hierarchies of values that grew as modernity came to dominate Jewish life.²⁵ In fact, the religious situation is explosive and fermenting on a deeper level than anyone wishes to acknowledge at this point. The whole Jewish people is caught between immersion in nihilism and immersion in redemption—both are present in immediate experience, and not just historical memory. To deny either pole in our time is to be cut off from historical Jewish experience. In the incredible dialectical tension between the two we are fated to live. Biblical theology already suggested that the time would come when consciousness of God out of the

restoration of Israel would outweigh consciousness of God out of the Exodus. In the words of Jeremiah: "The days will come, says the Lord, when it shall no longer be said: 'as God lives who brought up the children of Israel out of the land of Egypt' but 'as God lives who brought up the children of Israel from the land of the north and from all the countries whither He had driven them,' and I will bring them back into their land that I gave to their fathers" (Jer. 16:14-15).

DESPITE REDEMPTION, FAITH REMAINS DIALECTICAL. But if Israel is so redeeming, why then must faith be "moment faith," and why should the experience of nothingness ever dominate?

The answer is that faith is living in the presence of the Redeemer, and in the moment of utter chaos, of genocide, one does not live in His presence. One must be faithful to the reality of the nothingness. Faith is a moment truth, but there are moments when it is not true. This is certainly demonstrable in dialectical truths, when invoking the truth at the wrong moment is a lie. To let Auschwitz overwhelm Jerusalem is to lie (i.e., to speak a truth out of its appropriate moment); and to let Jerusalem deny Auschwitz is to lie for the same reason.

The biblical witness is that a permanent repudiation of the covenant would also have been a lie. "Behold, they say: our bones are dried up and our hope is lost; we are cut off entirely" (Ezek. 37:11). There were many who chose this answer, but their logic led to dissolution in the pagan world around them. After losing hope in the Lord of History, they were absorbed into idolatry—the faith of the gods of that moment. In the resolution of the crisis of biblical faith, those who abandoned hope ceased to testify. However persuasive the reaction may have been at that time, every such decision in Israel's history—until Auschwitz—has been premature, and even wrong. Yet in a striking talmudic interpretation, the rabbis say that Daniel and Jeremiah refused to speak of God as awesome or powerful any longer in light of the destruction of the Temple.²⁶ The line between the repudiation of the God of the covenant and the Daniel-Jeremiah reaction is so thin that repudiation must be seen as an authentic reaction even if we reject it. There is a faithfulness in the rejection; serious theism must be troubled after such an event. . . .

V. Explorations in Post-Holocaust Theological Models

Job and Renewed Divine Encounter

What, then, are the theological models that could come to the fore in a post-Holocaust interpretation of the relationship between God and man?

One is the model of Job, the righteous man from whom everything is taken: possessions, loved ones, health. It is interesting that his wife proposes that Job "curse God and die"; his friends propose that he is being punished for his sins. Job rejects both propositions. (At the end, God specifically rebukes the friends for their "answer.") The ending of the book, in which Job is restored and has a new wife and children, is of course unacceptable by our principle. Six million murdered Jews have not been and cannot be restored. But Job also offers us a different understanding. His suffering is not justified by God, nor is he consoled by the words about God's majesty and the grandeur of the universe surpassing man's understanding. Rather, what is meaningful in Job's experience is that in the whirlwind the contact with God is restored. That sense of Presence gives the strength to go on living in the contradiction.²⁷

The theological implications of Job, then, are the rejection of easy pieties or denials and the dialectical response of looking for, expecting, further revelations of the Presence. This is the primary religious dimension of the reborn State of Israel for all religious people. When suffering had all but overwhelmed Jews and all but blocked out God's Presence, a sign out of the whirlwind gave us the strength to go on, and the right to speak authentically of God's Presence still.

Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveichik has presented a related image, "the knock on the door" of history. The image is taken from the Song of Songs. Shulamit has been taken to the king's court, is separated from her lover for so long that she begins to waver and to doubt the reality of her past love. Suddenly there is a knock on the door. It must be her beloved, but she hesitates to answer—she is too tired from the experience of separation and defeat. Then the emotional realization that it may be her lover fires her and she goes to the door. By the time she does open the door, he is not to be seen (Song of Songs 5:1 ff.). The entire episode is so ambiguous that it can be dismissed as the reaction

of an overheated imagination, of romantic longing. But the knock has so keenly recrystallized her feelings for her beloved that she will not betray the relationship again.²⁸ As ambiguous as the secularity and flawed character of the reborn state is, it is enough to confirm the conviction not to "sell out to the court" and deny the past—or future—relationship with the beloved.

Israel's relationship to the Holocaust enormously intensifies the theological weight and testimony of both events. In turn, this deepens the irony of Jewish history and its dialectical impact on Christianity. Christian resistance to the possible new revelatory events in Judaism's history stems from the desire to be faithful to the finality of Christ. But inability to hear new revelation may be one of the signs of the death of the soul. (The phrase "may be one of the signs of the death of the soul" is used advisedly. It may be, in fact, that there is no revelation here. Those who deem it revelation may be mistaken, or it may be heard only by those for whom it is intended; those who do not hear it may not hear it because it is not addressed to them at all.)

One of the classic Christian self-validations has been the claim that the Old Covenant is finished; the old olive tree is blasted and bears no more fruit. New revelation in Judaism is perceived as incompatible with Christianity's superseding nature; the admission could destroy the structure of Christian authority. Yet confession by Christians of Judaism's ongoing life and acceptance in gratitude of a new harvest of revelation would, at one stroke, undercut the whole Teaching of Contempt tradition in Christianity. . . . In light of the Holocaust, classical Christianity is called "to die" to be reborn to new life; or it lives unaffected, to die to God and man.

The Suffering Servant and the Limits of Modernity

There is a second theological model that seems destined for a greater role in Jewish theology and, I dare say, for new meaning in Christianity: the Suffering Servant. Hitherto, this image has been played down by Jews because of its centrality in Christian theology. We are indebted to J. Coert Rylarsdaam for opening our eyes to this neglected model. Rylarsdaam once said that if being a Christian meant taking up the cross and being crucified for God, then the only practicing Christians were the Jews.

The Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53 sounds like a passage out of

Holocaust literature. He is led as a sheep to slaughter (a term much and unfairly used in reference to the Holocaust). He is despised and forsaken of men. The term "despised" is repeated twice in verse 3. He is not only held in contempt, but there is a contempt-evoking element in him: he stinks. He is a man of pain and disease, with no comeliness. Men look away from him. (The chapter reads like an eyewitness description of the inmates of concentration camps after a month or two.) The Suffering Servant is smitten by God, but not for his sins. He is struck for the sins of all men. (In biblical language, in which all human actions have their source in God, it is stated: "The Lord hath made to light on him the iniquity of us all.") . . .

To borrow a homely metaphor: The old coal mines had no gas detectors. Instead, canaries and parakeets were kept in the mines. When coal gas escaped, it would poison the birds, for they were much more sensitive to it than humans. When the birds were poisoned, the miners knew it was time to go to another vein or move in a different direction.

The Holocaust was an advance warning of the demonic potential in modern culture. If one could conceive of Hitler coming to power not in 1933 but in 1963, after the invention of nuclear and hydrogen bombs, then the Holocaust would have been truly universal. It is a kind of last warning that if man will perceive and overcome the demonism unleashed in modern culture, the world may survive. Otherwise, the next Holocaust will embrace the whole world.

Unfortunately, the strain of evil is deeply embedded in the best potentials of modernity. The pollution is in the liberating technology; the uniformity in the powerful communication and cultural explosion; the mass murder in the efficient bureaucracy. This suggests a desperate need to delegitimize the excessive authority claims of our culture. Yet some of its most attractive features may be the ones to lead us into the path of no return.

From this fact comes a call to Jews and Christians to resist the overwhelming attractions of the secular city even at its best. For as much as humanity needs immersion in the pluralism of its humanizing communications, and the freedom from fixed roles of its extraordinary options, and the liberating materialism of the city, it also needs groups to stay in spiritual tension with these same forces. The analogy may be to Ulysses, who must strap himself to the mast to make sure that, no matter how beautiful the siren song, he would not let himself be swept into the whirlpool of absolute commitment—and shipwreck. Chris-

tians and Jews are called upon to preserve their inner community and its testimony, out of the past and future. Their task is harder than Ulysses', for they are also called by the Holocaust to correct that very testimony's faults through participation in the new, open civilization. Let Gunter Lewy's and Gordon Zahn's studies of Catholics in Germany serve as warning.²⁹ The price of commitment to a *Kulturreligion* may be the inability to resist the worst moral possibilities in an otherwise good society. Once the center of loyalty is placed in that structure and there is absolute commitment to that society's values, then religion is powerless to check the excesses.

The Holocaust warns us that our current values breed their own nemesis of evil when unchecked—even as Nazi Germany grew in the matrix of modernity. To save ourselves from such error, we will have to draw on the warning of the experiences of the Suffering Servant. The Holocaust suggests a fundamental skepticism about all human movements, left and right, political and religious—even as we participate in them. Nothing dare evoke our absolute, unquestioning loyalty, not even our God, for this leads to possibilities of SS loyalties. SS Reichsführer Himmler could speak of "honor" and "decency" in carrying out the slaughter of millions. "By and large, however, we can say that we have performed this task in love of our people. And we have suffered no damage from it in our inner self, in our soul, in our character."³⁰

At the same time, the Holocaust demands a reinterpretation of the Suffering Servant model, especially for Christians, who have tended to glorify this role. It is a warning that when suffering is overwhelming, then the servant may be driven to yield to evil. . . . The redemptive nature of suffering must be in absolute tension with the dialectical reality that it must be fought, cut down, eliminated. I once visited a great Christian, who had gone to India and devoted his life to a community caring in extraordinary sacrificial love for brain-damaged little children. Yet the community had never thought of bringing in a doctor to diagnose what treatment might be available to improve the condition of the children.

The Controversy with God—and with the Gospels

There is yet a third theological model which comes to the forefront after the Holocaust. I would call it the Lamentations 3 model (finding it

in Chapter 3 of the Lamentations). It is the dominant theme in the writings of Elie Wiesel.

The early chapters of Lamentations are full of the "obvious" biblical solution: punishment for sins. Chapter 3 sounds a different note: "I am the man who has seen suffering." "God ate up my flesh and skin." "He [God] is a bear who stalks, and attacks me like a lion . . ." The agony is inflicted by God, but there is no note of sinfulness. There is only anger and pain. "And I said: my eternity and my hope from God has been lost." The climax is not guilt, but control, anger, and a feeling of being cut off from God.

Says Wiesel on Rosh Hashanah: "This day I had ceased to plead . . . on the contrary, I felt very strong. I was the accuser, God the accused. . . . I had ceased to be anything but ashes, yet I felt myself to be stronger than the Almighty . . ." Or again, "man is very strong, greater than God. When You were deceived by Adam and Eve, You drove them out of Paradise. . . . But there are men here whom You have betrayed, whom You have allowed to be betrayed, gassed, burned; what do they do? They pray before You. They praise Your name!"³¹

In Lamentations, what pulls the narrator through is the sudden memory of past goodness. "This I recall to mind, therefore I have hope: the Lord's mercies, for they are not consumed." The Exodus memory is sustaining.

Wiesel teaches us that in the very anger and controversy itself is the first stage of a new relationship, perhaps the only kind of relationship possible with God at this point in history. Could it be that the banal quality of prayer in our time is due to the fact that there are not enough prayers that, in our anger, we can say? Is it because we lack a prayer on the Holocaust that expresses the anger—that, at least, blames God? Anger is more compatible with love and involvement than pleasant niceties and old compliments.

Again, these are direct implications of this model. Centrally: it is to justify human beings, not God. It suggests a total and thoroughgoing self-criticism that would purge the emotional dependency and self-abasement of traditional religion and its false crutch of certainty and security. It involves a willingness to confess and clear up the violations of the image of God (of women, Jews, blacks, others) in our values, and a willingness to overcome the institutionalism that sacrifices God to

self-interest. (One of the defenses of Pius XII's silence is that he felt he should not endanger the church and the faithful by stopping genocide.³² If true faith means taking up the cross for God, then when will there ever be a truer time to be crucified, if necessary? Even if the attempt to help is doomed to failure, when will it ever be more appropriate to risk one's life or the church's life than to stop the crucifixion of children?) Justifying people means the fullest willingness, in both Judaism and Christianity, to defend the revolt against God and the faith that grows out of the desire to liberate man. Yet here too, the Holocaust demands a dialectical capacity from us. Rebels are not usually good at conserving; but if we simply validate the contemporary, we fall into idolatry and prepare the legitimization of another Holocaust.

In this model we find the source for one of the fundamental steps Christianity must take after the Holocaust: to quarrel with the Gospels themselves for being a source of anti-Semitism. For the devout Christian, the New Testament is the word of God. Yet even the word of God must be held to account for nourishing hatred, as well as for culpability in, or being an accessory to, the fact of genocide. Nothing less than a fundamental critique and purification of the Gospels themselves can begin to purify Christianity from being a source of hatred. The Holocaust reveals that Christianity has the stark choice of contrition, repentance, and self-purification, or the continual temptation to participate in genocide or pave the way for it. If Christianity has barely survived the first Holocaust, I do not believe that it can survive a second with any real moral capital at all. As painful as is the prospect, then, of a surrender of missionary enterprise to the Jew or a critique of the Gospels, this is possible out of a faith purged by the flames of the Holocaust. Ultimately it will be less painful than the alternative, of being accessory to the once and future fact of genocide. It will take extraordinary sacrificial effort to achieve this. But extraordinary catastrophes are not mastered by routine treatment or evasion. Only extraordinary outbursts of life or creativity can overcome them. To overwhelming death one must respond with overwhelming life. . . .

VI. *The Central Religious Testimony after the Holocaust*

Recreating Human Life

In the silence of God and of theology, there is one fundamental testimony that can still be given—the testimony of human life itself. This was always the basic evidence, but after Auschwitz its import is incredibly heightened. In fact, it is the only testimony that can still be heard.

The vast number of dead and morally destroyed is the phenomenology of absurdity and radical evil, the continuing statement of human worthlessness and meaninglessness that shouts down all talk of God and human worth. The Holocaust is even model and pedagogy for future generations that genocide can be carried out with impunity—one need fear neither God nor man. There is one response to such overwhelming tragedy: the reaffirmation of meaningfulness, worth, and life—through acts of love and life-giving. The act of creating a life or enhancing its dignity is the counter-testimony to Auschwitz. To talk of love and of a God who cares in the presence of the burning children is obscene and incredible; to leap in and pull a child out of a pit, to clean its face and heal its body, is to make the most powerful statement—the only statement that counts.

In the first moment after the Flood, with its testimony of absurd and mass human death, Noah is given two instructions—the only two that can testify after such an event. “Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth” (Gen. 9:1–7), and “but your life blood I will hold you responsible for”—“who sheds man's blood, shall his blood be shed; for in the image of God made He man” (Gen. 9:5–6). Each act of creating a life, each act of enhancing or holding people responsible for human life, becomes multiplied in its resonance because it contradicts the mass graves of biblical Shinar—or Treblinka.

Recreating the Image of God

This becomes the critical religious act. Only a million or billion such acts can begin to right the balance of testimony so drastically shifted by the mass weight of six million dead. In an age when one is ashamed or embarrassed to talk about God in the presence of the burning chil-

dren, the image of God, which points beyond itself to transcendence, is the only statement about God that one can make. And it is human life itself that makes the statement—words will not help.

Put it another way: the overwhelming testimony of the six million is so strong that it all but irretrievably closes out religious language. Therefore the religious enterprise after this event must see itself as a desperate attempt to create, save, and heal the image of God wherever it still exists—lest further evidence of meaninglessness finally tilt the scale irreversibly. Before this calling, all other “religious” activity is dwarfed.

But where does one find the strength to have a child after Auschwitz? Why bring a child into a world where Auschwitz is possible? Why expose it to such a risk again? The perspective of Auschwitz sheds new light on the nature of childrearing and faith. It takes enormous faith in ultimate redemption and meaningfulness to choose to create or even enhance life again. In fact, faith is revealed by this not to be a belief or even an emotion, but an ontological life-force that reaffirms creation and life in the teeth of overwhelming death. One must silently assume redemption in order to have the child—and having the child makes the statement of redemption. . . .

The Context of an Image of God

In a world of overpopulation and mass starvation and of zero population growth, something further must be said. I, for one, believe that in the light of the crematoria, the Jewish people are called to re-create life. Nor is such testimony easily given. One knows the risk to the children.

But it is not only the act of creating life that speaks. To bring a child into a world in which it will be hungry and diseased and neglected, is to torment and debase the image of God. We also face the challenge to create the conditions under which human beings will grow as an image of God; to build a world in which wealth and resources are created and distributed to provide the matrix for existence as an image of God.

We also face the urgent call to eliminate every stereotype discrimination that reduces—and denies—this image in the other. It was the ability to distinguish some people as human and others as not that enabled the Nazis to segregate and then destroy the “subhumans”

(Jews, Gypsies, Slavs). The ability to differentiate the foreign Jews from French-born Jews paved the way for the deportation first of foreign-born, then of native, French Jews. This differentiation stilled conscience, stilled the church, stilled even some French Jews. The indivisibility of human dignity and equality becomes an essential bulwark against the repetition of another Holocaust. It is the command rising out of Auschwitz.

This means a vigorous self-criticism, and review of every cultural or religious framework that may sustain some devaluation or denial of the absolute and equal dignity of the other. This is the overriding command and the essential criterion for religious existence, to whoever walks by the light of the flames. Without this testimony and the creation of facts that give it persuasiveness, the act of the religious enterprise simply lacks credibility. To the extent that religion may extend or justify the evils of dignity denied, it becomes the devil's testimony. Whoever joins in the work of creation and rehabilitation of the image of God is, therefore, participating in “restoring to God his scepter and crown.” Whoever does not support—or opposes—this process is seeking to complete the attack on God's presence in the world. These must be seen as the central religious acts. They shed a pitiless light on popes who deny birth control to starving millions because of a need to uphold the religious authority of the magisterium; or on rabbis who deny women's dignity out of loyalty to divinely given traditions.

VII. *Religious and Secular after the Holocaust*

THE END OF THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DICHOTOMY. This argument makes manifest an underlying thrust in this interpretation. The Holocaust has destroyed the meaning of the categories of “secular” and “religious.” Illuminated by the light of the crematoria, these categories are dissolved and not infrequently turned inside out.

We must remember the many “religious” people who carried out the Holocaust. There were killers and murderers who continued to practice organized religion, including Christianity. There were many “good Christians,” millions of respectable people, who turned in, rounded up, and transported millions of Jews. Some sympathized with

or were apathetic to the murder process, while perceiving themselves as religiously observant and faithful—including those who did an extra measure of Jew-hunting or betrayal because they perceived it as an appropriate expression of Christian theology. Vast numbers of people practiced religion in this period, but saw no need to stand up to or resist the destruction process. . . .

IF "ALL IS PERMITTED," WHAT IS THE "FEAR OF GOD"? The Holocaust is overwhelming witness that "all is permitted." It showed that there are no limits of sacredness or dignity to stop the death process. There were no thunderbolts or divine curses to check mass murder or torture. The Holocaust also showed that one can literally get away with murder. After the war a handful of killers were punished, but the vast majority were not. Catholic priests supplied disguises and passports for mass murderers to help them escape punishment. German and Austrian officials cleared them of guilt—or imposed a few years of prison for killing tens of thousands. Men in charge of legally ostracizing Jews and clearing them for destruction became secretaries to cabinet ministers. Men who owned gas-producing companies, those who had built crematoria, were restored to their full ownership rights and wealth. Thirty years later, an anti-Nazi woman was imprisoned for seeking to kidnap and deliver for extradition a mass murderer, while he went free. Austrian juries acquitted the architects of the Auschwitz gas chambers. If all is permitted, why should anyone hold back from getting away with whatever one can? The prudential argument, that it is utilitarian not to do so, surely is outweighed by the reality that one can get away with so much. And the example of millions continually testifies against any sense of reverence or dignity to check potential evil.

I would propose that there is an explanation; a biblical category applies here. Whoever consistently holds back from murder or human exploitation when he could perpetrate it with immunity—or any person who unswervingly devotes himself to reverence, care, and protection of the divine image which is man, beyond that respect which can be coerced—reveals the presence within of a primordial awe—"fear of God"—which alone evokes such a response.

The biblical category suggests that fear of God is present where people simply cannot do certain things. It is, as it were, a field of force that prevents certain actions. . . . When fear of God is not present, there are no limits.

RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR SELF-DEFINITION IN LIGHT OF AUSCHWITZ. Nor can we take self-definitions seriously. During the Holocaust, many (most?) of the church's protests were on behalf of Jews converted to Christianity. Consider what this means. It is not important to protest the murder of Jews; only if a person believes in Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior is there a moral need to protest his fate.³³ Can we take such self-definitions of religious people as reflection of belief in God?

When, in May and June 1967, it appeared that another Holocaust loomed, men of God remained silent. Pope Paul VI, moved by all sorts of legitimate or normal considerations (concern for Christian Arabs, concern for holy places, theological hang-ups about secular Israel) remained silent. A self-avowed atheist, root source of much of modern atheism, Jean-Paul Sartre, spoke out against potential genocide—even though he had to break with his own deepest political alliances and self-image in his links to Arabs and Third World figures to do so. He knew that there is one command: Never another Holocaust. Which is the man of God, which the atheist? By biblical perspective? By Auschwitz perspective? Are title, self-definition, official dress, public opinion—even sincere personal profession—more significant than action?

If someone were to begin to strangle you, all the while protesting loudly and sincerely: "I love you!" at what point would the perception of that person's sincerity change? At what point would you say, "Actions speak louder than words"? As you turn blue, you say, "Uh . . . pardon me, are you sure that I am the person you had in mind . . . when you said, 'I love you'?"

One must fully respect the atheist's right to his own self-definition. But from the religious perspective, the action speaks for itself. The denial of faith has to be seen as the action of one determined to be a secret servant, giving up the advantages of acknowledged faith, because at such a time such advantages are blasphemous. Perhaps it reveals a deeper religious consciousness that knows there must be a silence about God—if faith in Him is not to be fatally destroyed in light of the Holocaust and of the abuse of faith in God expressed by a Himmler. Thus, the atheist who consistently shows reverence for the image of God, but denies that he does so because he is a believer in God, is revealed by the flames to be one of the thirty-six righteous—the hidden righteous, whom Jewish tradition asserts to be the most righteous, those for whose sake the world exists. Their faith is totally

inward and they renounce the prerequisites of overt faith; and for their sake the world of evil is borne by God.³⁴

THE STATE OF ISRAEL: A STUDY IN SECULARITY AND RELIGION AFTER AUSCHWITZ. By this standard, the “secular” State of Israel is revealed for the deeply religious state that it is. Both its officially nonreligious majority as well as its official and established religious minority are irrelevant to this judgment. The real point is that after Auschwitz, the existence of the Jew is a great affirmation and an act of faith. The re-creation of the body of the people, Israel, is renewed testimony to Exodus as ultimate reality, to God’s continuing presence in history proven by the fact that his people, despite the attempt to annihilate them, still exist.

Moreover, who show that they know that God’s covenant must be upheld by re-creating his people? Who heard this overriding claim and set aside personal comfort, cut personal living standards drastically, gave life, health, energy to the rehabilitation of the remnants of the covenant people? Who give their own lives repeatedly in war and/or guard duty to protect the remnant? Surely the secular Jews of Israel as much as, or more than, the religious Jew, or non-Jews anywhere.

The religious-secular paradox goes deeper still. Instead of choosing to flee at all costs from the terrible fate of exposure to genocide, instead of spending all their energy and money to hide and disappear, Jews all over the world—secular Jews included—renewed and intensified their Jewish existence and continued to have and raise Jewish children. Knowing of the fate to which this choice exposes them (a fate especially dramatically clear in Israel, where year after year the Arabs have preached extermination); aware of how little the world really cared, or cares, and that the first time is always the hardest—what is one to make of the faith of those who made this decision and who live it every day, especially in Israel? The answer has been given most clearly by Emil Fackenheim. To raise a Jewish child today is to bind the child and the child’s child on the altar, even as father Abraham bound Isaac. Only, those who do so today know that there is no angel to stop the process and no ram to substitute for more than one and one-half million Jewish children in this lifetime. Such an act then, can only come out of resources of faith, of ultimate meaningfulness—of Exodus trust—on a par with, or superior to, father Abraham at the peak of his life as God’s

loved and covenanted follower. Before such faith, who shall categorize in easy categories the secular and the devout Israeli or Jew?

A classic revelation of the deeper levels can be found in the “Who is a Jew” controversy, and in the Israeli “Law of Return,” which guarantees every Jew automatic admittance into Israel. This law has been used against Israel, in slogans of “racism,” by those who say that if Israel only de-Zionizes and gives up this law she would have peace from her Arab neighbors, and by Christians and other non-Jews who then assess Israel as religiously discriminatory. All these judgments cost the secular Israelis a great deal—not least because any weakening of public support means a heightened prospect of genocide for themselves and their children. In turn, the secular Israeli is bitterly criticized by observant Jews for not simply following the traditional definition of who is a Jew. In 1974 this issue even disrupted attempts to form a government, at a time when life-and-death negotiations hung in the balance. Why, then, has the law been stubbornly upheld by the vast majority of secular Israelis?

It reveals the deepest recesses of their souls. They refuse to formally secularize the definition of “Israeli” and thereby cut the link between the covenant people of history and the political body of present Israel—despite their own inability to affirm, or even their vigorous denial of, the covenant! They see Auschwitz as revelatory and commanding, normative as great events in covenant history are, and they are determined to guarantee automatic admission to every Jew—knowing full well he is always exposed (by covenantal existence) to the possibility of another Holocaust with no place to flee. The lesson of Auschwitz is that no human being should lack a guaranteed place to flee again, just as the lesson of the Exodus was that no runaway slave should be turned back to his master (Deut. 23:16). (Needless to say, there is self-interest involved also—more Jews in Israel strengthen the security of Israel. But the admixture of self-interest is part of the reality in which religious imperatives are acted upon by all human beings.)

In light of this, Zionism, criticized by some devout Jews as secular revolt against religion and by other observant Jews for its failures to create a state that fully observes Jewish tradition, is carrying out the central religious actions of the Jewish people after Auschwitz. Irony piles upon irony! The re-creation of the state is the strongest suggestion that God’s promises are still valid and reliable. Thus the secularist

phenomenon gives the central religious testimony of the Jewish people today. In the Holocaust many rabbis ruled that every Jew killed for being Jewish has died for the sanctification of the name of God. In death as in life, the religious-secular dichotomy is essentially ended.

Dialectical Reflections on the End of the Secular-Religious Difficulty

CONTRA HUMANISM. Once we establish the centrality of the reverence for the image of God and the erosion of the secular-religious dichotomy after Auschwitz, then the dialectic of the Holocaust becomes visible. Such views could easily become embodied in a simple humanism or a new universalist liberation that is totally absorbed in the current secular option. To collapse into this option would be to set up the possibility of another idolatry. True, it would be more likely a Stalinist rather than a fascist idolatry; but it reopens the possibility of the concentration of power and legitimacy which could carry out another Holocaust. We are bidden to resist this temptation. Indeed, there is a general principle at work here. Every solution that is totally at ease with a dominant option is to be seen as an attempt to escape from the dialectical torment of living with the Holocaust. If you do escape, you open up the option that the Holocaust may recur. A radical self-critical humanism springing out of the Holocaust says no to the demons of Auschwitz; a celebration of the death of God or of secular man is collaboration with these demons.

CONTRA PROTEAN MAN. The fury of the Holocaust also undercuts the persuasiveness of another modern emphasis—the sense of option and choice of existence. This sense of widespread freedom to choose identity and of the weakening of biological or inherited status is among the most pervasive values of contemporary culture. It clearly grows out of the quantum leap in human power and control through medicine and technology, backed by the development of democratic and universalist norms. It has generated a revolt against inherited disadvantage, and even genetic or biological limitations. The freedom of being almost protean is perceived as positive—the source of liberation and human dignity. In light of the Holocaust, we must grapple with the question anew. Is the breaking of organic relationships and deracination itself

the source of the pathology which erupted at the heart of modernity? Erich Fromm has raised the issue in *Escape from Freedom*. Otto Ohlendorf—the head of D Einsatzgruppe, and one of the very few war criminals willing to admit frankly what he did and why—stressed the search for restored authority and rootedness (e.g., the failure to conserve the given as well as the freely chosen in modern culture) as a major factor in the scope and irrationality of the Nazis' murderous enterprise. Since the attack started against the people of Israel, but planned to go on to Slavs and other groups, it poses a fundamental question to the credibility of modern culture itself. There has not been enough testing and study of this possibility in the evidence of the Holocaust yet, but it warrants a serious study and an immediate reconsideration of the persuasiveness of the "freedom-of-being" option in modernity. The concept is profoundly challenged by the Jewish experience in the Holocaust.³⁵ For the demonic assault on the people of Israel recognized no such choice. Unlike the situation that prevailed in medieval persecutions, one could not cease to be a Jew through conversion. In retrospect, liberation turned out to be an illusion that weakened the victims' capacity to recognize their coming fate or the fact that the world would not save them—because they were Jews.

CONTRA THE SUPERIORITY OF THE SPIRIT OVER THE FLESH. This insight also reverses the historical, easy Christian polemic concerning the "Israel of the flesh" versus "Israel of the spirit." After all, is not Israel of the spirit a more universal and more committed category, a more spiritually meaningful state, than the status conferred by accident of birth? Yet the Holocaust teaches the reverse. When absolute power arose and claimed to be God, then Israel's existence was antithetical to its own. Israel of the flesh by its mere existence gives testimony, and therefore was "objectively" an enemy of the totalitarian state. By the same token neither commitment to secularism, atheism, or any other faith—nor even joining Christianity—could remove the intrinsic status of being Jewish, and being forced to stand and testify. Fackenheim, Berkovits, Rubenstein, and others have spoken of the denial of significance to the individual Jew by the fact that his fate was decided by his birth—whatever his personal preference. But classical Jewish commentators had a different interpretation. The mere fact that the Jew's existence denies the absolute claims of others means that the Jew is testifying. The act of living speaks louder

than the denial of intention to testify, as I have suggested in my comments on fear of God above. During the Holocaust, rabbis began to quote a purported ruling by Maimonides that a Jew killed by bandits—who presumably feel freer to kill him because he is a Jew—has died for the sanctification of the Name, whether or not he was pressured before death to deny his Judaism and his God.³⁶ This testimony, voluntarily given or not, turns out to be the secret significance of “Israel of the flesh.” A Jew’s life is on the line and therefore every kind of Jew gives testimony at all times.

Israel of the spirit testifies against the same idolatry and evil. Indeed, there were sincere Christians who stood up for their principles, were recognized as threats, and sent to concentration camps. However, Israel of the spirit only has the choice of being silent; with this measure of collaboration, it can live safely and at ease. Not surprisingly, the vast majority chose to be safe. As Franklin Littell put it, when paganism is persecuting, Christians “can homogenize and become mere gentiles again; while the Jews, believing or secularized, remain representatives of another history, another providence.”³⁷ It suggests that from now on one of the great keys to testimony in the face of the enormously powerful forces available to evil, will be to have given hostages, to be on the line because one is inextricably bound to this fate. The creation of a forced option should be one of the goals of moral pedagogy after the Holocaust. It is the meaning of chosenness in Jewish faith. The Christian analogy of this experience would be a surrender of the often self-deceiving universalist rhetoric of the church and a conception of itself as people of God—a distinct community of faith with some identification—that must testify to the world. . . .

VIII. *Living with the Dialectic*

The dialectic I have outlined is incredibly difficult to live by. How can we reconcile such extraordinary human and moral tensions? The classical traditions of Judaism and Christianity suggest: by reenacting constantly the event which is normative and revelatory. Only those who experience the normative event in their bones—through the community of the faith—will live by it.³⁸ I would suggest, then, that in the decades and centuries to come, Jews and others who seek to orient themselves by the Holocaust will unfold another sacral round. Men

and women will gather to eat the putrid bread of Auschwitz, the potato-peelings of Bergen-Belsen. They will tell of the children who went, the starvation and hunger of the ghettos, the darkening of the light in the Mussulmen’s eyes. To enable people to reenact and relive Auschwitz there are records, pictures, even films—some taken by the murderers, some by the victims. That this pain will be incorporated in the round of life we regret; yet we may hope that it will not destroy hope but rather strengthen responsibility, will, and faith.

After Auschwitz, one must beware of easy hope. Israel is a perfect symbol for this. On the one hand, it validates the right to hope and speak of life renewed after destruction. On the other hand, it has been threatened with genocide all along. At the moment it is at a low point—yet prospects for a peace also suddenly emerge. Any hope must be sober, and built on the sands of despair, free from illusions. Yet Jewish history affirms hope.

I dare to use another biblical image. The cloud of smoke of the bodies by day and the pillar of fire of the crematoria by night may yet guide humanity to a goal and a day when human beings are attached to each other; and have so much shared each other’s pain, and have so purified and criticized themselves, that *never again will a Holocaust be possible*. Perhaps we can pray that out of the welter of blood and pain will come a chastened mankind and faith that may take some tentative and mutual steps toward redemption. Then truly will the Messiah be here among us. Perhaps then the silence will be broken. At the prospect of such hope, however, certainly in our time, it is more appropriate to fall silent.

NOTES

1. Elie Wiesel, *Night* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1960), pp. 43-44.
2. Michael Dov Weissmandl, *Min Hametzar* (1960; reprint ed., Jerusalem, n.d.) p. 24. See also Weissmandl’s report of his conversation with the papal nuncio in 1944. He quotes the nuncio as saying: “There is no innocent blood of Jewish children in the world. All Jewish blood is guilty. You have to die. This is the punishment that has been awaiting you because of that sin [deicide].” Dr. Livia Rotkirchen of Yad Vashem has called my attention to the fact that the papal nuncio tried to help save Jews and used his influence to do so. Weissmandl’s quote appears to be incompatible with that image. Dr. Rotkirchen speculates that Weissmandl, in retrospect, attributed the statement to the wrong person. In any event, this judgment that the Jews deserved

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their fate as punishment for deicide or rejecting Christ is a strong and recurrent phenomenon. On the papal nuncio's work, see Livia Rotkirchen, "Vatican Policy and the Jewish 'Independent' Slovakia (1939-1945)," *Yad Vashem Studies* 6 (1967): pp. 27-54.

3. Pastoral letter of March 25, 1941, A. B. Freiburg, no. 9, March 27, 1941, p. 388; quoted in Günter Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 294.

4. Saul Friedländer, *Pius XII and the Third Reich: A Documentation* (New York: Knopf, 1966), p. 97. Cf. the whole discussion of the decrees by the Vatican, *ibid.*, pp. 92-99.

5. "Ein Wort zur Judenfrage, der Reichsbruderrat der Evangelischen Kirche in Deutschland," issued on April 8, 1948 in Dietrich Goldschmidt and Hans-Joachim Kraus, eds., *Der Ungekündigte Bund: Neue Begegnung von Juden und christlicher* (Stuttgart, 1962), pp. 251-54. The extent to which Vatican circles helped Nazi war criminals escape is only now becoming evident. See on this Gitta Sereny, *Into That Darkness* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), pp. 289-323. See also Ladislav Farago, *Aftermath: Martin Bormann and the Fourth Reich* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974).

6. Cf. memorandum submitted to Chancellor Hitler, June 4, 1936, in Arthur C. Cochrane, *The Church's Confession Under Hitler* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), pp. 268-79; J. S. Conway, *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968), pp. xx, xxiii, 84-85, 261-65.

7. A. Roy Eckardt, *Elder and Younger Brothers* (New York: Scribner's, 1967), p. 107.

8. The trial record of the Einsatzgruppen leaders shows that of twenty-four defendants, Herren Schubert, Lindow, Schulz, Blume, Braune, Sandberger, Haensch, Strauch, and Klingelhofer were lawyers. Other professionals included architect Blobel, economist Sieberg, professor Six, banker Noske, secondary-school instructor Steimle, economist Ohlendorf, dentist Fendler, and last but not least, clergyman Biberstein.

9. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, vol. 60, p. 433, quoted in Eliezer Berkovits, *Faith After the Holocaust* (New York: Ktav, 1973), p. 18.

10. Arthur Herzberg, *The French Enlightenment and the Jews* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Uriel Tal, *Yahadut V'Natzrut BaReich Ha-Sheni* [Jews and Christians in the Second Reich], 1870-1914 (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1969); and Eleanore Sterling, *Er Ist Wie Du: Früh Geschichte des Anti Semitismus in Deutschland, 1915-1850* (Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1956). One should also note Elie Wiesel's biting words on the moral collapse in the camps of "the intellectuals, the liberals, the humanists, the professors of sociology and the like." Elie Wiesel, "Talking and Writing and Keeping Silent," in Franklin H. Littell and Hubert G. Locke, *The German Church Struggle and the Holocaust* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1974), p. 273. It could be that relativism and tolerance, in themselves good or neutral moral qualities, combine with excessive rationalism and functionalism to weaken the capacity to take absolute stands against evil: they rationalize that everything is relative and there is no need to say no! at all costs.

11. Henry Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970), *passim* and summary, pp. 295-307; David Wyman, *Paper Walls* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1968).

12. *Punishment for War Crimes: The Inter-Allied Declaration Signed at St. James's Palace, London on 13th January, 1942 and Relative Documents* (New York: United Nations Information Office, [1943], pp. 5-6. See also U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1942* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), vol. 1, p. 45, and *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1941* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1958), vol. 1, p. 447.

13. Alexander Donat, *The Holocaust Kingdom: A Memoir* (New York: Rinehart, 1965), p. 103.

14. F.E. Cartus [pseud.], "Vatican II and the Jews," *Commentary*, January 1965, p. 21.

15. Elie Wiesel, *The Accident* (New York: Hill & Wang, 1962), p. 91.

16. Elie Wiesel, "The Death of My Father," in *Legends of our Time* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), pp. 2, 4, 5, 6, 7; *idem*, *The Gates of the Forest* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), pp. 194, 196, 197, 198, 224, 225-26.

17. Gershom Scholem, *Sabbatai Zevi: The Mystical Messiah* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).

18. Cf. Maimonides, *Commentary on the Mishnah*, Sanhedrin, chap. 10, mishnah 1.

19. Eliezer Berkovits, *Faith after the Holocaust* (New York: Ktav, 1973); Emil Fackenheim, *God's Presence in History* (New York: New York University Press, 1970); Richard Rubenstein, *After Auschwitz* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), especially pp. 128-29.

20. Richard Rubenstein, "Homeland and Holocaust," in *The Religious Situation* 1968 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 39-111.

21. "Wiesel, *Night*, p. 71.

22. Wiesel, *The Gates of the Forest*, pp. 225-26.

23. Cf. Rudolf Hoess, *Commandant of Auschwitz* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1959), pp. 88-91; Saul Friedlander, *Counterfeit Nazi: The Ambiguity of Good*, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1969); p. 21-22, 36, 59, 64.

24. Cf. I. Greenberg, *The Rebirth of Israel: Event and Interpretation* (forthcoming).

25. Compare and contrast Marshall Sklare (with Joseph Greenblum), *Jewish Identity on the Suburban Frontier* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), especially pp. 214-49, 322-26, with T. I. Lenn and Associates, *Rabbi and Synagogue in Reform Judaism* (Hartford: Lenn and Associates, 1972), especially chap. 13, pp. 234-52. Note especially the younger age shift on p. 242. Cf. also how low Israel rates in the "essential" category of being a good Jew, in respondents in Sklare, p. 322.

26. Cf. B.T. Yoma 68b.

27. Jose Faur, "Reflections on Job and Situation Morality," *Judaism* 19, no. 2 (Spring 1970): 219-25, especially p. 220; André Neher, "Job: The Biblical Man," *Judaism* 13, no. 1 (Winter 1964): 37-47; Robert Gordis, "The Lord Out of the

Whirlwind," *ibid.*, especially pp. 49–50, 55–58, 62–63. See also Margarethe Susman, *Das Buch Hiob und das Schicksal des jüdischen Volkes* (Zurich: Steinberg, 1946).

28. Joseph B. Soloveichik, "Kol Dodi Dofek," in *Torah U'Meluchah*, ed. Simon Federbush (Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 1961), pp. 11–44, especially pp. 21–25.

29. Günter Lewy, *The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany*; Gordon C. Zahn, *German Catholics and Hitler's Wars: A Study in Social Control* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1962); *idem*, *In Solitary Witness: The Life and Death of Franz Jägerstätter* (London: Chapman, 1966).

30. *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal* (Nuremberg, 1947–49), vol. 29, 1919. PS printed in *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* vol. 4, pp. 518–72 especially pp. 559, 563–64, 566 ff., quoted in Joachim C. Fest, *The Face of the Third Reich* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p. 119.

31. Wiesel, *Night*, pp. 73–74.

32. Falconi, *The Silence of Pius XII* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), pp. 74–80; Saul Friedländer, *Pius XII and the Third Reich*, pp. 123, 139 ff.

33. J. S. Conway, *The Nazi Persecution of the Churches*, pp. 261–65; Saul Friedländer, *Counterfeit Nazi*, pp. 37, 38, 145–49; Falconi, *Silence of Pius XII*, p. 87; Friedländer, *Pius XII and the Third Reich*, pp. 92–102, but see also pp. 114 ff.; Gitta Sereny, *Into That Darkness*, pp. 276 ff., 292–303. See also Weissmandl, *Min Hametzar*, pp. 21–22, 23–24. Cf. also Karl Barth's mea culpa on the Jewish Issue in a letter to Eberhard Bethge quoted in E. Bethge, "Troubled Self-Interpretation and Uncertain Response in the Church Struggle," in Littell and Locke, *German Church Struggle*, p. 167.

34. Cf. Irving Greenberg, "A Hymn to Secularists" (Dialogue of Irving Greenberg and Leonard Fein at the General Assembly in Chicago, November 15, 1974 [cassette distributed by Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, New York, 1975]).

35. Cf. Erich Fromm, *The Fear of Freedom* (American title, *Escape from Freedom*), 1st ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1942). See George Stein, *The Waffen SS* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970); for Ohlendorf's testimony, see *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, October 1946–April 1949* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. 4; *United States of America v. Otto Ohlendorf et al.*, case No. 9, pp. 384–91.

36. The purported Maimonides ruling is quoted in Rabbi Simon Huberband's essay on Kiddush Hashem (Sanctification of God's name), found in the collection of his Holocaust writings printed under the title *Kiddush Hashem* (Tel Aviv: Zachor 1969), p. 23. Rabbi Menachem Ziemba, the great rabbinical scholar of Warsaw, is quoted as citing the same Maimonides ruling in Hillel Seidman, *Yoman Ghetto Varsha* (New York: Jewish Book, 1959), p. 221. An exhaustive search of Maimonides' work (including consultation with Dr. Haym Soloveichik, who has edited a mimeographed collection of Maimonides' writings on Kiddush Hashem for the Hebrew University) makes clear that there is no such ruling in Maimonides. The acceptance during the Holocaust of the view that Maimonides issued such a ruling—even by scholars of Maimonides such as Ziemba—only shows the urgency of the need for such a ruling. The Rabbis instinctively recognized that every Jew was making a statement when killed in the Holocaust—the very statement that the Nazis were so frantically trying to silence by killing all the Jews. This is contra Richard Rubenstein's comments in "Some Perspec-

tives on Religious Faith After Auschwitz," in Littell and Locke, *German Church Struggle*, p. 263.

37. Franklin H. Littell, *The German Phoenix: Men and Movements in the Church in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y., 1960), p. 217.

38. Haggadah of Pesach; Exod. 12:13, 20:1–14, 22:21; Lev. 11, esp. v. 45, 19:33–36, 23:42–43, 25:34–55; Deut. 4:30–45, 5:6–18, 15:12–18, 16:1–12, 26:1–11; Josh. 24; Judg. 2:1–5, 11–12; Jer. 2:1–9, 7:22–27, 11:1–8, 16:14–15, 22:7–8, 31:3–33, 32:16–22, 34:8–22; Ezek. 20; Neh. 9.